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* * .
I have been asked to speak to you tonj~ght on the
subject -- "The Courts and the Constitution."
'Jhla tl tIe is
broad enough to cover not only the whole field of civil
liberties, but every field of constitutional la~r. Howe"ler.
since this seminar is being presented by the Institute of
Industrial Relations of the University at" California. I shall
contine my remarks to the tield of labor law, or the application
by the courts of the civil l1berties guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights to the activities ot labor organizations. At the
outset I am constrained to state that any student of ou~
statutory law and court decisions on this subject must be
impressed wlttitne hodgepodge or-conflicting rules and ideas
which now exist. Historically speaking~ the labor movement
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1s as old as civ111zation 1tself. The revolt ot the Israel1tes 
agalnst the Pharaohs ot Egypt was motivated by the oppress1ve 
burden of labor exacted by the Pharaohs from the subjugated 
Israellteso Whlle Moses has been Justly acclaimed as the 
greatest law glver, he 1s also entltled to the appellatlon of 
belng the flrst great labor leadero His methods were sc)mewhat 
drastic. and 1t employed today to accomp11sh a labor obJectlve. 
would probably be condemned by both Congressional 
legislat1ve oomm1tteeso They were, however. effective. as we 
are told that he succeeded In leading his followers from a 
land of bondage to a po1nt well on the road to a land flowing 
with milk and honeyo 
Down through the ages the struggle between master 
and servant has contInued. and gradually the pllght of those 
who toll tor a living has been 1mproved to a polnt where both 
our leglslatures and our courts are being importuned by 
employer groups to 1mpose restr1ctions on the activities of labor 
organizations so that they will be less effective 1n their efforts 
to exact the worker~s share ot the wealth his labor produceso 
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It is my purpose tonight to discuss the present 
trends 1n legislation and court dec1s1ons 1n the fleld of 
employer-employee relat1ons. These trends may be ep1tom1zed 
1n two questlons which I will propound and endeavor to answer. 
These questlons may be stated as follows: Are the clvil 
lIberties of labor organizatIons guaranteed by the Bill of 
RIghts be1ng destroyed p1ecemeal by act10ns of state courts 
and state leg1slatures? Is not this process belng furthered 
by the tendency of the UnIted states supreme Court to uphold 
such state actlons by over-emphasIzing the doctr1.ne of states' 
rights in certaln areas of labor actIvIty? 
While the problem may be stated qUIte s;lmply to be 
whether or not the constItutIonally protected civIl lIberties 
of labor organizatlons are being destroyed piecemeal by state 
courts, state leglslaturesjJ and the supreme Court. of the 
United states, the reason for the destruct10n and the solution 
of the problem 1s not an easy oneo 
In 1940, the supreme Court of the United states 
decided the case of Thornhill Vo Alabama (310 u.s~ 88), 1n 
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wh10h 1 twas unequ1vocall)" picket1ng by 
labor unions was a torm of express10n proteoted by the 'irst 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the united states Oonstitut1on. 
It was olearly stated that "1n the oircumstanoes ot our times 
the dissemlnation ot 1nformatlon concerning the tacts ot a 
labor dispute must be regarded as within that area ot tree 
discussion that is p~tected by the Constitution" and that 
lI'lbe streets are natural and proper places tor 1the dlssemination 
of in.tormatlon and opinion; and one is not to h~lve the 
exerclse ot his 11berty of express10n in appropl:'ia te places 
abr1dged on the plea tha tit may be exercised 111 some other 
place." 
Although it Is axiomatIc that neIther the Congress, 
nor any statej may pass laws 1n contravent1on ot the mandate 
of the federal ConstItut1on and Its amendments. and. hence no 
law abrIdg1ng freedom of expression may const1tutionally 
exist. in 1950 the supreme Court ot the UnIted States decided 
three cases 1n which peaceful picket1ng was held to have been 
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properly enjoined. Prior to these three cases which I will 
d18CU88~ the Supreme court had held that peacetul picketins 
could not enjoined even though the picketIng was done by 
strangers to the employees and employer (A. F. ot L. v. Swtng. 
312 u.s. 321 [1941]), or even though there was a total absence ot 
the employer-employee relatlonshlp (Baker,r • Pastr,r Drivers 
Local v. Wahl, 315 u.s. 769 [1942). In 1949 the tide, which 
had been obvlously pro-labor, began to turn with the Supreme 
Court's dec1sion in Giboney v. Empire storage and Ice Company 
(336 u.s. 490) wherein a MissourI Injunction against peacetul 
picketing was upheld where the objective to be attained by 
the picketing allegedly vIolated a state Antl-Comblnatlon law. 
In 1950, the Supreme Court decided Hughes v. Super10r Court 
ot California (339 u.s. 460) upholding a Ca11fornia 1njunctlon 
against ploketlng a1med at forcing an employer to hire Negro 
help in proportion to the Negro oustomers of the store~ Th1s 
decision was based on the proposition that Ca11fornia us 
pub11c polley ot no racial dlscrim1natlon would be 1nterfered 
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with it-the inJunction were set aside. It 18 1nteres t1ng' to
In the G1bone1note the difference between these two oases:
case. 
a state law was involved; 1n the California case, a
-
state Supreme Court decision purporting to decide what was the
public policy of the state t1aS under consideration. In 1950..
the United S ta tea Supreme Court decided Teams tera Union v.
Hanke (339 u.s. 470), in which a somewhat different state
There the union was picketing topublic policy was involved.
compel the plaintiff, who was a self-employed proprietor of a
garage and used car outlet w1th no employees, to operate a
union shop and keep business hours similar to thoae kept by
The court. in affirming and upholding theother union shops.
1njunct1on'ot the Washington court. held that a balance must
be kept between "self-employer shops" and "union standards";
that the encouraging of "self-employer" shops had been
stressed by "some of our profoundest thinkers from Jefferson
In Building & Service Employees union Voto Brandeis."
Qazzam (339 008.532). also decided in 1950, an injunction
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granted by a Washington court, was also upheld. The picketing
in the Gazzam case was by strangers in an attempt to force
the employer to coerce his employees into joining the union.
The un1on act1vity in the Qazzam case was held 'v1olative ot
the state's anti-Injunction statute. It 18 1n~~re8t1ng to
note that the Washington statute was enacted tor the expressed
purpose ot prohibiting such union activity. It was stated in
statute (wash. Rev. stat. § 7612-2 [Supp. 1~~40]) that:
11
.Under prevailing economic conditions. ..the
individual unorganized worker is ...helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect his t]~eedom of
labor .he should be tree to decline to associate with
[and] It Is necessary that he have rull
fellows. 
..
freedom ot association. selt-organization~ and <Iesignation ot
" It was also heldrepresentatives of his own choosing. ...
in the Qazzam case that the type of "coercion" exercised by
unions was also prohibited by the Labor Management
Reiatlona Act (29 U.S.CoAo. § 158 (b) (l) (A»o
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From the foregoing. it i8 obvioU8 that the Supreme
Court has receded from its 1940 concept that peaceful
~1cket1ng was a form of expression guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. In a
case decided on June 17th ot this year --Teamsters against
vogt (77 Sup. ct. Rep. 1166). a majority of the court
reviews its earlier pronouncements and, in errect, it not
expressly. 
overrules the Thornhill and Swing cases with their
broad eta tements that peaceful p1cketing is a rorm of
expression guaranteed b1 the Constitution. In tihe majority
opinion (the case was decided by a ~ive-to-three-court) it
seems to me that we find the reason tor the turning tideo
Writers have long hinted that changing econom1o and political
p~essure8 have been responsible but have been loath to come
right out and say that was so because the enforcement of
constitutional mandates is the duty of every court. Judge and
lawy r 
without regard to either economic or political
In other words. every person haa anpressures of the day.
-8-
absolute right to rely on the protections guaranteed him by
the Constitution despite his economic or political status or
the particular economic or political charactel- of the times.
A majority of the court in the Vogt case has this to 88.y in
discussing its former opinions:
"Inevitably. 
therefore.
doctrine of a particular case 'is not allowed to end with its
enunciation, and. .an expression in an opinion yields
later to the impact of facts unforeseen.,n (Jaybird Mining
Co. 
v. We1r, 271 U.S. 609, 619.) And "It 18 not too
surprising that the response ot the states --legislative and
Judicial --to use or the injunction in labor controversies
should have given rise to a series ot adjudications in this
Court relating to the limitations on state action contained
in the provisions ot the Due Process Clause ot the Fourteenth
Amendment.
It1salsonot~o_8U!:2::18~ngth!~e~aml!1cat1on of
these adjudications should disclose an evolving. nota!tatio.
course ot decisions." In discussing the Thornhill case.
majority said: "Soon, however. the Court came 1;0 realize that
-9-
the broad pronounoements, but not the apeol1"iO holdlng. or 
Thornhl1l had to yield 'to the Impact ot tacts untoreseen,' 
or at least not surrlclently appreciated" and, in speaking or 
cases tollowlns. it was said that they "made manltest 
that picketing, even though 'peacetul', involved more than 
Just commun1cat1on ot 1deas and could not be Immune fr()M all 
state regu1atlon." The Court then quoted trom the Wob1 case 
(315 u.s. 169, 176) that "tPioketing by an orsanized group 18 
more than tree speech, slnce it involves patrol ot a 
particular localit¥ and since the ve~ presence ot a picket 
may Induce ac tlon ot one kind or another. ,qul te 
irrespectlve ot the nature ot the ideas whioh at-e being 
disseminated.'" The majority sought to Justify 1ts course ot 
action by saylng that the later cases placed strong rellanoe 
"on the partlcular tacts in each case [and] demonstrated a 
growlng awareness that these cases lnvo1ved not so much 
questlons ot tree speech as revlew ot the balance struck by 
a state between plcketlng that involved more than 'publlclty9 
... 10-
and oompet1ng 1nterests ot state pollcy." Whlle It ls 
admltted that a state can not elther through lts oourts or 
legislature lawtully automatioally enjoin peacetul pIcketing, 
what Is. apparently, to be the new rule 1s la1d down: that 
there must be an InvestIgat10n 1nto the conduot and ~ae. 
ot p1cket1n~. Prom th1s 1t clearly appears that peacetul 
p1cketing 1n and ot Itself can no longer be cons1dered a8 a 
means ot express1on. We are warned that the court wl11 
sorutlnize olosely the objeotlve to be atta1ned and the means 
used to obtaIn 1t; that the state may. by 1egislat1ve 
enactment, or Judlolal decls1on, ban certain ty;pes ot 
plcketlng and certaln types ot union or labor objectlves 
wlthout the restraln1ng thought that such legialatlon or 
judiclal decision must conform to the oonstitutlonal mandate 
that an Indlvldua1 9 s treedom ot expresslon shall not be 
abrldged. Mro Justlce Douglas dissented trom the views 
expressed In the majorlty opinlon 1n the Vogt case. I was 
pleased to know, as I am sure you wll1 be, that his dlssentlng 
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opin1on was concurred 1n by Mr. Chlef Jus tlce Warren and Mr. 
Justice Black. ~. Justice Douglas states that the court has 
"now come full o1rc1e" trom the Thornh11l case; that 
"retreat" began in the Hanke case and became a "'rout" in the 
Graham case (Local Unlon No. 10, Unlted Assln. C)t Journeymen. 
Plumbers and Steamtltters, etc. v. Graham, 345 11.S. 192). He 
states that the Graham case made the I·state court's 
characterization ot the picketers' 'purpose' ••• well-nigh 
conclusive. Cons1derat10ns ot the proximity ot pioketing 
to conduct whlch the state could oontro1 or pre,rent were 
abandoned, and no longer was it necessar,y tor tile state court's 
decree to be narrowly drawn to proscribe a specjLtic evil .. 
Mr 0 Jus t1ce Douglas states tba t when the court iaigned 
vogt case it signed a "to1'1D8.1 surrender • [that] state 
courts and state leg1s1atures are tree to decide whether to 
permit or suppress any particular picket 11ne tor any reason 
other than a blanket pollcy against all picketing. tt He says, 
and Mr. Chief' Just1ce Warren and Mro Justioe Black, agree .. 
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that "I would adhere to the result reached 1n Swlng. I would 
return to the test enunciated in Giboney -- that this form ot 
expression can be regulated or prohibited only to the extent 
It forma an essentIal part ot a course ot ,eonduot which 
the state can regulate or prohiblt." While I, personally, am 
not so sure that we should return to the test alMlounced in 
the Q1boney case which, it will be recalled, involved 
plcket1ng whlch was held to be 1n vlolation ot J~1ssouri's 
Antl-Comblnatlon law, I wholeheartedly agree tmlt all courts 
should adhere to the rule enunc1ated 1n the 'I'holl"nhll1 case --
peaceful picketlng Is withIn the protectlon ot the Flrst 
Fourteenth Amendmentso In the f1rst Instance, it 1s 
dlttlcult tor me to see how the plcket1ng In th~ Giboney case 
could have been consldered to be In vlolatlon at the M1ssouri 
statute 0 In other words, It appears to me that the stated 
objectlve -- to prevent the sale ot lee to non-unlon 
peddlers -- was a lawful objectlve and that the 1njunctlon 
whlch restralned the picketlng was a dlrect Invaslon of the 
-13-
guaranteed freedom ot express1on as set forth 1n the Thornh1ll
caseo While picketing 18 conduct as well 88 expression, 1t
appears to me that the stateVs 1nterest 18 in the regulation
ot the oonduc~, rather than the ~xpre88~on. By conduct. I
mean the pIckets' demeanor. the misleadIng. or truthful
character o~ their signs and placards. their numerical strength.
and the like. It this is wha t Mr. Jus t1ce Douglas means bl
returning to the Giboney test, I agree with him; ir he means
that the mere tact that the picketing was to "compel Empire
to abide by union rather than by state regulation or trade"
(as the court held), I can not agree with him since to do 80
would mean that I approved of interpreting any legislative
measure as a ban on peaceful picket1ng. Since I believe that
pea~etu! picketing 18 a rorm or expression guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments I do not believe that a state
has the powe~ to pass legislation which e1the~ direotll o~
indirectly contravenes the Constitution and 1ts amendments
true with regard to courtThe same thing 1ag ot courseg
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dec1810ns ....... ".,.. ... court a 
court .. or the Supreme Court ot the Unlted state; •• 
very approprIate to this disouss10n 18 a law review 
article I read some time ago (102 Penns7lvanla Law Revlew 959 
[1954 J) entitled "IPederallsm and Labor Relatlona in the United 
statea" by Paul ft. Haya .. Protessor of Law. Columbia University 
School of" Law.. Protessor Hays. in discussing the Congresslonal 
intent so tar as the Nat10nal Labor Relations Acst and the 
Labor-Management Relatlons Act were concerned, lllrote ot the 
1953 bearings betore the senate Committee on Labor and Public 
Weltare on proposed revisions of" the Labor~anagement 
Re la tlona Ac t. He sald. qul te correo tly a8 i t B~ppeara II that 
there is still l1ttle comprehens10n on the part ot elther 
Senatore or others ot the complexitIes lnherent 1n the 
application at a flexible tederallsm to the field of" labor 
relations 0 I read with a rather terrible amusement ot remarks 
made at the hearings by Senator Goldwater (Hearings betore 
Committee on Labor and Public Weltare on Proposed Revisions 
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Aet ot-1941. ., 
1st Sesso (1953) when he demanded to know the basis for a 
witness' statement that "the laws or the United States shall 
be the supreme law ot the land." When he was told that the 
statement was based on the Constitution, he asked "The Congress 
has to be given that right by the states by agreement; Is that 
right?" (606)0 Senator Goldwater was so deeply shocked by 
the statement that he later repeated it to another witness and 
asked g "Do you teel, as attorney general of Nebraska, that 
that is a true statement, that in this particular f1eld the 
federal law is the supreme law ot the land?" (819)0 
There were also remarks by other Senators 1n the same vein 
But Protessor Hays also noted that when the Sena'tors asked 
labor -leaders to suggest some workable plans the situation waa 
no better since they seemed to be merely tt parrotlng" the 
opInIons of their counsel and that the lawyers' tormulas 
"were derived from the decisions which the Court had been 
rorced to abandon as inadequate when it relinquished to 
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Congres8 the adm1nistrat1on ot federal1sm 1n th1s f1eld." I 
say that I read the statements w1th a rather terr1ble 
amusement because 1t our leg1s1ators, both stat,!! and nat1onal, 
do not know that the federal Cons t1 tut10n and the law8 ot the 
federal government are the law o~ the land 1n 84) far as s ta te 
leg1s1at1on 1s concerned. and that state legIslatIon must not 
oontravene the Constitutlon and the law8 passed by the federal 
government 1n f1elds 1n whIch it may constltut1c)nally 
legislate, there 18 little hope that senslble g .sane and 
const1tutional laws wlll be passed in the fIeld of labor 
relat1ons. 
The present leglslation in the fIeld c.t labor and 
labor-management 18 conceded by practIcally all wrIters In 
the field to be unworkable and unwleldy. '!be lEtgIs1atlon 1a 
too broad and too vague and uncerta1n w1th reSpE!ct to a 
delIneatIon of state and federal government area~8 ot control. 
The recent case ot QU88 v. Utah Labor Relat10ns Board (77 sup. 
ct. 598 [1951]) 1s a good example ot the hlatus ex1st1ng 
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between the national and state laW8. In the Quss oase g the 
Supreme Court held that Congress, by vesting the NatIonal 
Labor RelatIons Board with JurisdIction, had completely 
displaced the state's power to deal in the area except where 
the board had ceded JurIsdiction to the state pursuant to the 
proviso to Section lOCal or the Labor-Management RelatIons 
Act (29 UoS.C.A., § 160(8) [1952]). Where the Labor 
Management Relations Act either permits, or prohibIts, some 
activlt.1. the NatIonal Labor Relat10ns Board has exclusIve 
JurIsdiction and a state may not enjoIn that which 18 eIther 
permItted or prohIbIted; and a state may not substItute Its 
own regulatIons when the NatIonal Labor Relations Board 
declines JurIsdIctIon over a dIspute on the ground that 
regulatIons would not be in furtherance ot the purposes or 
the act. It g as 1n the QU8S case, the NatIonal Board retuses 
to take JurisdIctIon and yet also retuses to cede jur1sdiction 
to the state, a no-man's land results where the state 1s 
powerless to act. 
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It seems to me that the so-oalled "r1ght-to-work" 
laws which are now belng passed so treely In varlous part. ot 
thls state may present grave problema ot constltut1onal law 
in the very near future. It, and when, one ot them comes 
before the Supreme Court ot Callfornla, It appears to n. that 
the court, ot whlch I am one of seven, Is golng to be 
confronted with a dllemma. slnce 1t 1s the law ot Ca11fornia 
that the "closed shop" is legalo In ~ oplnion, if the 
"right-to-work" laws are held const1tutlonal, these laws wlll 
eftectively put an end to the closed ahopo If the "right-to-
work" laws are held constItutional, then, of course, 
picketing tor elther a olosed shop, or tor organizational 
purposes, wlll be unlawfUl under the recent deoisions or the 
supreme Court ot the United states. And 1t. and when, one ot 
those laws comes before that court, it will be held 
constitutIonal under the aazzam case and picketIng for a 
closed shop may then be .enJoined. So tar aa I know, no 
proper case involvIng a "rlght~to-workH law has yet been 
-19-
Court United S Suoh 1aw8 
have unltormly held oonst! tutlonal by Supl'eme Court 
decisioGS in Arizona, Plorlda, GeorSia, LouIsiana, OregoD 
Texas a8 ot early 1956. (Arizona :name Restaurant, Inc. v. 
Baldwln. 3- L.a.R.M. 2707; Selt v. ~71or, 235 S.W.2d 45; 
Plumber If P1petltters tlnlon v. Robertson" 4 .... SO.2d 889; 
WoOdard Y. Col11er, 18 S .. 2d 526, Hanson v. Ope:ratlng 
Engineers, 79 So .. 2d 199J Gllbertson v. CUl1na1'7 Al11anoe. 282 
P. 632, Construotion If Gene:ral Laborers unton v.Stepbenson, 
225 S .W.2d 958.) 
I thlnk probably the only :ray ot 11ght whioh emersea 
trom these dec1alons and the later deoision. ot tne Supreme 
Court ot the Unlted states i. that they have not been 
unanimous decisions. Partloularly 1n the caaea betore the 
supreme Court o~ the Un1ted states, there have been 
dlssenting opinions. It should be borne 1n mind that the 
membersh1p ot courts changes trom time to t1me either by 
reslgnatlon, or by death, and that 1n many case8, a8 
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evIdenced by the dissenting opInions of the late Justice 
OlIver Wendell Holmes, the dIssenting op1nion eventually 
becomes the law ot the land, rather than Just a minorIty vIew 
as of the time It was wrltten. It has been sald that the 
very fact that there are dissenting oplnlons 1s a healthy 
thing tor the country -. it shows a divergence ot opinIon 
1t shows that there are men who have tarsighted vlews and who 
are thInkIng In broad terms, rather than wi th the 
shortslghtedness that comes with living trom day to day In 
the rea trio ted orb 1 t of the times. For example, the 
dIssentIng opInIon of Mr. Justice Douglas In the vogt case, 
In which ChIef Justice Warren and Justice Black ooncurred, 
could become the law tomorrow It the membershlp ot the court 
changed, or It two ot the present m~mbers changed their 
views which is not an unheard-of proposit1on. Further 
ret1ectlon, further study. together wlth a case presented by 
possibly better Intormedattorneysmlght have·theresull1 ot 
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makIng the dissentIng opinion the law ot tomorrow, rather 
than the minor1ty v1ew ot today. 
It must be remembered that judges are only human 
be1ngs. When a man becomes a judge and dona his Judioial 
robes. he takes with him his ent1re baokground 1ncluding hi. 
soclal. economio and pol1tIcal philosoph1es wh1ch may have 
remained dormant during hls private lite. They become 
manltest Immediately atter he becomes a judge and is called 
upon to deoide oases Involvlng soclal. economic and polItical 
problema. '!'he trend of the times ls an important factor 1n 
bringing to lIght the leanlng ot the Judge In the field. ot 
actlvlty 1n whloh preJud1ce., pressures and publl0 sentiment 
are brought to bear in aohlevlng a desired result. Many 
legislative enactments and too many court deolalons are the 
result of these prejudices. pressures and public sentiment 
which should play no part in the law making process. There 
can be no doubt that the present trend i8 toward the 
restrictlon ot actIvities ot labor organizations whioh twenty 
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years ago were held to be nothing more than the exercise ot 
fundamental constitutional r1ghta. It must be oonceded that 
the Constitution has not been changed but the peraonnel ot 
the Supreme Court ot the United states has changed and 1fl11 
oontlnue to change as each new member takes hls place on that 
court. 
Whl1e I deplore the present trend 1n the decillions 
ot that court whloh are designed to restrlot and stifle the 
aotlvities ot labor organizatlons which are seeklng to 
Pl~mote the soclal and economic weltare ot the workers .)t this 
country_ I have an abiding faith 1n the talrness ot the great 
mass of the American people who I believe will un1te 1n support 
ot a leadershlp wbloh has tor its obJeotive the establljshment 
ot a society where soclal equalit.J and economic stablllty are 
not only Utopian theories but realitles to the end that the 
unalienable rights to 11te, liberty and the pursuit ot 
happlness may be enjoyed by all. 
~23-
